

**Page Denied**

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH  
WASHINGTON

August 22, 1984

TOP SECRET  
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN/TALENT-KEYHOLE/  
COMINT CHANNELS JOINTLY

25X1  
MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director, Intelligence Community Staff

SUBJECT: Issue Papers for Off-Site Conference on  
September 21-22

The issue papers are useful statements of agenda items for the conference and should help to focus the discussion. By themselves, however, they may be too general to provide the basis for choices among alternative courses of action and the development of guidance for resources planning. In complicated areas such as "telemetry denial," the participants may need additional analyses by the Community Staff or well-organized and thorough presentations at the conference.

In addition, I suggest the following changes within the issue papers to improve the statements of factors to be addressed:

I. Unconventional Threat A

In order to distinguish more clearly the responsibilities of the Intelligence Community in relation to policymakers, I suggest that the last paragraph on Issue A be changed to read:

"The principals should also consider whether a specific community mechanism (e.g., NFIB) should be designated to receive alerts of instability, arrange for coordinated assessments of the impact on U.S. interests, alert policy authorities and military planners, and ensure appropriate intelligence response to the needs of policymakers and planners."

TOP SECRET  
DECL: OADR

BYE-29260-84

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN/TALENT-KEYHOLE/  
COMINT CHANNELS JOINTLY

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

Unconventional Threat B

In order to help focus discussion on one of the major policy/operational issues raised under this heading, I suggest that the following sentence be added to "Factors to be Addressed":

"Another issue which should be considered is the necessity to develop procedures for full coordination with Chiefs of Mission before overt or clandestine HUMINT collectors are sent into a foreign country and to ensure that Chiefs of Mission are informed of the activities of such collectors when they are operating in-country. Other issues which should also be discussed are operational control of collectors in the field and ground rules for training exercises."

II. Telemetry Denial

To provide more scope, balance, and accuracy in the statement of factors to be addressed, I suggest that Part B be changed to read as follows:

"B. Factors to be Addressed. The Intelligence Community should continue to give special focus and attention to both near-time and long-term denial-compensation measures.

25X1  
25X1

"The contribution of imagery to intelligence on Soviet missiles will be improved with the advent of new overhead electro-optical  assuming optimum tasking (e.g., sampling rates, inter-discipline cooperation).

25X1

25X1

"Collection  from missile plumes by the use of peripheral sites requires further evaluation in comparison to a

25X1

25X1

25X1

"Improvements in RADINT and optical-signature collection against RVs are already programmed.

TOP SECRET

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN/TALENT-KEYHOLE/  
COMINT CHANNELS JOINTLY

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

"Sharing between NFIP and non-NFIP programs should be encouraged, in order to realize maximum benefit from all sources contributing to the challenge.

"Telemetry Security: Consideration should be given to the question whether additional security measures should be taken to increase the protection of telemetry collection and analysis. The benefits of compartmentation should be carefully weighed against the resulting restrictions on analysis and use.

"The principals should discuss the alternatives presented above and consider specific guidance on the most promising to pursue for recovery of information lost through telemetry denial."

### III. Survivability of Collection and Processing Systems

To spell out points which should be discussed in the off-site conference, I suggest that the third sentence of the factors be changed to read:

"Intelligence Community managers need to be apprised of the direction, magnitude and potential programmatic and budgetary consequences of Program Manager recommendations and have an opportunity to discuss the value and impact of these recommendations on the total NFIP in various scenarios from peacetime to general nuclear war."

### V. Manpower

Should we not also discuss professional development and training issues under this heading?

  
Hugh Montgomery

TOP SECRET

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN/TALENT-KEYHOLE/  
COMINT CHANNELS JOINTLY